We show that compensation is higher for CEOs with more general managerial skills using detailed biographic information on CEOs of the S&P 1,500 firms in 1993-2007. This relation is driven by managers' industry mobility and past experience as a top manager and is robust to the inclusion of firm-and CEO-level controls, including fixed effects. Comparing the actual CEO's pay to the pay of a portfolio of CEOs who are specialists in the industries that match the CEO's past industry experience implies a 10% pay premium to generalists. Furthermore, we provide evidence that pay increases the most when firms hire a new CEO from outside the firm and switch from a specialist to a generalist manager. Our findings suggest that an increase in the importance of general human capital relative to firm-specific human capital helps to explain the increase in executive pay.
Introduction
The rapid rise in the level of U.S. executive pay in the last decades has sparked a heated debate over the causes of this trend (Frydman and Jenter (2010) ). These causes, however, are not completely understood, particularly the role of the managerial labor market. In fact, we can also observe a trend in the market for executives, as CEOs are now more likely to be hired from outside the firm than internally promoted. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2009) argue that general managerial skills gained importance over time relative to firm-specific skills, which leads to more external hires and an increase in equilibrium average pay for CEOs.
1 In this paper, we consider the hypothesis that general managerial skills are paid at a premium relative to firm-specific skills.
Using the panel of S&P 1,500 firms' CEOs in the period of 1993-2007, we test whether compensation is higher for generalists than specialists CEOs. We use full biographic information of the CEOs including age, educational background and, most importantly, detailed information on all current and past positions in his professional career. This detailed biographic information is drawn from the BoardEx and includes not only past positions in S&P 1,500 firms but also positions outside S&P 1,500 firms and non-board positions. Our sample includes more than 4,000 CEOs, whose resumes include more than 32,000 different past positions. In order to measure the level of general managerial skills we focus on industry mobility, experience as top executive, and education. For each CEO in each year, we observe the number of industries in which he worked (past number of industries), whether he held a CEO position at a different company (past CEO dummy), and whether he has a business degree (general education dummy). We construct an index of general managerial ability, as given by the first factor of the principal component analysis of the three individual measures of general ability.
This index summarizes information on each manager's general human capital and allows us to classify a CEO as a generalist or a specialist. We find that the average general managerial ability index has increased over the last 15 years, consistent with the notion that general skills have become more important relative to firm-specific skills.
We find that the general managerial ability index is positively and significantly associated with total CEO pay. The effect is economically meaningful. A one-standard deviation in the index of general managerial ability is associated with an additional 6% in total pay, which indicates that a generalist CEO earns a quarter of a million dollars more per year than a specialist CEO.
Furthermore, we find that the positive relation between pay and general managerial ability is driven by industry mobility and past experience as a top manager and holds for both cash and equity-based pay. The results are robust to the inclusion of many firm and CEO characteristics as control variables, including firm and CEO fixed effects.
To measure the magnitude of the premium that generalist CEOs command over their specialist peers, we develop a new measure of CEO excess compensation inspired by the measures of excess value used in the corporate diversification literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) . We compare the market wage of a CEO with multi-industry experience with the average market wage of a matched portfolio of CEOs with single-industry experience. For each CEO-year, the excess compensation is the difference between the total compensation awarded to the CEO and his imputed compensation, calculated as the average CEO compensation of the portfolio of industries where the CEO worked up to a given year. The industry-level compensation is the median compensation of CEOs that worked only in a single industry up to a given year. We find that CEOs with a multi-industry background excess compensation is 10% higher than that of single-industry CEOs. Furthermore, the average excess compensation of multi-industry CEOs has increased over the last 15 years and is closely linked to the evolution of the total CEO pay.
We then examine whether the market wage premium of generalist CEOs is heterogeneous across different types of firms. We find that the general managerial ability wage premium is pervasive across small and large firms. Interestingly, the premium is more prevalent in diversified firms (i.e., conglomerates) than in stand-alone firms. We investigate this issues in more detail and find that conglomerates pay more to executives that have moved across industries in the past. This result is in line with Rose and Shepard (1997) and Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (1998) who also find that conglomerates pay more to CEOs in order to compensate for their managerial ability.
Finally, we test whether CEOs with more transferable skills across firms and industries capture higher market wages when they change jobs. We examine cases of CEO turnover and classify them into an internal or an external hire. We further classify an external hire into a switch from a specialist to a generalist or a switch from a generalist to a specialist. We find a stronger increase in CEO pay when there is a switch from a specialist to a generalist CEO through an external hire.
This is direct evidence that general managerial human capital does command a premium in the CEO labor market and that the premium arises when a generalist CEO is hired from outside the firm.
Overall, we conclude that managerial attributes are important to understanding CEO pay and that general managerial human capital does command a premium in the CEO labor market. Our findings are consistent with Graham, Li, and Qiu (2009) that find that manager fixed effects explain the majority of the variation in executive pay. Furthermore, the evidence is consistent with the view that CEO pay is determined in a competitive labor market between firms and CEOs, and that pay has increased because conditions in the market have changed. In particular, the evidence is consistent with the view that a change in the CEO job function toward emphasizing general skills helps to explain the rise in CEO compensation over the last decades (Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2008) and Frydman (2009) ). This change could be a result of product market changes due to industry deregulation (Hubbard and Palia (1995) , and Cunat and Guadalupe (2009a)), foreign competition (Cunat and Guadalupe (2009b) ), or skill-biased technological change (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) ).
Other authors have alternative explanations of the rise in CEO compensation. Gabaix and Landier (2006) argue that the CEO job has not changed but that the increase in pay can be mostly attributed to the growth in firm size and to the assertive matching of top talent to large firms. Kaplan and Rauh (2010) argue that greater firm scale and superstars are more likely to explain the increased skewness at the top of the income distribution. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) argue that the surge in CEO pay is due to rent extraction by powerful CEOs that award themselves excessive pay packages.
Our analysis is most closely related to Frydman (2009) who finds that the rise in executive pay is explained by the growing importance of general managerial skills in the second half of the twentieth century using a sample of the top 50 firms. Frydman (2009) measures the generality of human capital by educational background and occupational mobility within a firm (i.e., the number of organizational areas an executive worked such as production, sales, or human resources). There are several ways in which our analysis is different from hers. First, our measure of general managerial skills focuses on external mobility across industries and firms, rather than internal mobility within a firm, and past experience as a top manager. Second, we use a comprehensive data set that covers the sample of S&P 1,500 firms in recent decades. Finally, we directly test the hypothesis that generalist CEOs are paid more than specialist CEOs by developing a new measure of excess compensation.
Our analysis extends the work of Murphy and Zabojnik (2008) and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) by providing evidence on the effect of firm-specific and general managerial skills on CEO turnover. These models predict a compensation premium not only for externally hired CEOs, but also for hiring industry outsiders, particularly after industry shocks. Cremers and Grinstein (2010) show that the external market for CEOs tends to respond more to industry shocks. Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2010) provide evidence that firms involved in leverage buyouts do trade-off general versus firm-specific skills of CEOs while performing their hiring decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the sample and variables used in this study. In Section 3 we present the empirical results on the relation between CEO compensation and general managerial skills. In Section 4 we investigate the specific case of diversified firms or conglomerates. Section 5 concludes. TDC1 ). In some tests we consider cash compensation and equity-based compensation separately.
Sample and Data Description
We develop a new measure of excess compensation that aims to capture the compensation premium (or discount) of a generalist or multi-industry CEO (i.e., an executive who worked in 2 Although Execucomp contains data starting in 1992, we drop this first year due to the small number of observations (only 433 CEO-firms). 3 Cadman, Klasa, and Matsunaga (2009) and Gao, Li, and Lemmon (2010) argue that there are systematic differences in CEO compensation, both in terms of levels and structure, across private and public firms and for Execucomp and non-Execucomp firms. 4 The CEO profiles missing in BoardEx are mainly from executives that have retired or deceased before 2000.
several different industries) when matched to an equivalent portfolio of specialist or singleindustry CEOs. This measure is inspired by the excess value measure commonly used in the corporate diversification literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) Table 1 show a significant increase in both average total compensation and average excess compensation, as well as a positive correlation between the two. 5 Because the average excess compensation is always positive over time, we conclude that multi-industry CEOs are paid at a premium. Moreover, this evidence suggests that the increase in total CEO compensation is linked to an increase in the compensation premium of generalist CEOs over specialists working in similar industries.
We investigate the importance of general human capital of CEOs is related to the increase in CEO pay over the recent years. To do so, we create an index of the generality of the CEO's human capital (general managerial ability index) based on the CEO's education and past work experience (prior to the current position) in publicly-listed firms. We consider the following proxies of general managerial ability:
Past number of industries: number of industries at the four-digit SIC level where a CEO has worked in publicly-listed firms, prior to the current position. 5 The analysis of the average excess compensation over time in Table 1 and Figure 1 is restricted the sample to multi-industry CEOs. This helps us to better interpret the generalist CEO excess compensation since the measure is simply capturing how much more (or less) a generalist is paid when compared to its equivalent portfolio of specialists.
Past CEO dummy: dummy variable that equals one if a CEO held a CEO position at another publicly-listed firm, prior to the current position.
General education dummy: dummy variable that equals one if the CEO has a business degree, irrespective of its level (undergraduate, master and PhD).
In some tests and in the robustness section we use some variations of the prior three variables:
Past multi-industry experience: dummy variable that equals one if a CEO worked in more than one industry (four-digit SIC), prior to the current position
Past number of firms: number of publicly-listed firms a CEO worked, prior to the current position.
We use principal components to transform the proxy variables into a smaller number of factors that contain the same information as the original proxy variables. The first principal component is the linear combination of the three variables (past number of industries, past CEO dummy, and general education dummy) used to proxy for general managerial ability. Following the usual practice, we use all principal components whose eigenvalues exceed one (i.e., that have more explanatory power than any one of the original proxies by itself). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2 and they give us a single factor for the general managerial ability index with a eigenvalue of 1.14. As expected, the factor loadings are positive on all three proxies. The factor gives about equal weight to the past number of industries and general education dummy, and a much lower weight to the past CEO dummy. Thus, higher levels of general human capital are reflected in a higher value of the index. We standardize the index to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one.
Our measure is related to the index of generality of human capital defined in Frydman (2009).
Frydman's measure takes into account the CEO's education and his occupational mobility within the current firm (i.e., in different areas of the firm such as sales and production). However, it
does not look at the industry and top manager experience of a CEO. So we focus on the role of external mobility rather that internal mobility in the CEO labor market.
We find an increase in the importance of the general managerial skills of CEOs that is consistent with the findings in Frydman (2009). Figure 1 and Table 1 show that that there is a shift in the relative importance of general versus firm-specific managerial skills with the index of general managerial ability steadily increasing over time. This is consistent with executives running firms in more recent years having more general skills, which are transferable across firms and industries. Table 3 shows the average total and excess compensation and the average general managerial ability index by industry. As we have argued before, industry level phenomena, such as technological shocks, changes in product market competition and regulation might determine the need for top executives with more general skills. We find significant variation across industries in terms of the index of general managerial ability as well as in terms of the differences in pay between generalists and specialists CEOs.
Cross-Industry Variation
The telecom industry has the highest average level of generality of CEO human capital (0.35) and at the same time is also the industry where the CEOs get the highest average total pay ($6.9 million). Moreover, generalist CEOs (defined as the CEOs with a general managerial ability index above the median) in this industry are the ones paid the highest amount. When looking at our excess compensation measure we find that CEOs of telecom firms with resumes that include positions in other industries receive on average $5.3 million more than CEOs that have spent all their careers only in the telecom sector (single-industry CEOs). In fact, during the 1990s, the telecom industry changed rapidly not only in terms of technological innovation (cell phones, 6 The individual measures that are part of the index are also increasing over time, particularly during the first half of our sample period. The average past number of industries steadily increases from 1 in 1994 to 1. (2000)). The rapid increase in competition associated with deregulation and the need to rapidly adjust to technological innovation could increase the demand for managers who can respond to this type of environment, namely managers with strong general skills.
The industry with the lowest general managerial skills index is Oil, Gas and Coal (-0.142). We still find a premium in generalists' compensation in this industry. However, the difference in average total compensation between generalists and specialists is less than 1 million dollars.
Except for CEOs in the Consumer Durables industry, we find a positive and statistically significant generalist compensation premium across all industries, both when comparing the average total compensation of generalist to specialists as well as when using the excess compensation measure. Table 4 shows summary statistics for compensation, CEO characteristics and firm characteristics.
Summary Statistics of CEO and Firm Characteristics
The average CEO in our sample receives $4 million of total compensation, which corresponds to $1.2 million in cash and $2.1 million in equity incentives. The mean excess compensation is $1.4 million.
Besides the CEO characteristics that are included in the general ability index already described above (past number of industries, past CEO dummy, general education dummy), we measure the following additional CEO attributes:
CEO tenure: number of years a CEO has held the top executive position in the firm. We expect a negative relation between the number of years in the CEO position and compensation, as more recently hired CEOs are expected to have their compensation adjusted to recent market conditions.
External hire dummy: dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is hired from outside the firm, and zero otherwise (i.e., promoted internally). We expect a premium to exist for externally hired CEO, since the company has to face labor market wages to hire him.
CEO age: the age of the CEO in years.
A CEO in our sample has worked in one other industry than his current industry and two other firms, on average. 17% of the CEOs have previous experience as a top executive and 48% have a business degree. They are 55 years old and spend 8 years in a given CEO position on average, and about 22% of the CEOs are hired from outside the firm.
In our tests we control for the following firm characteristics:
Size: total sales in US$ millions. Gabaix and Landier (2005) argue that size is the main determinant of CEO compensation, because CEO talent is matched to firm size.
Leverage: total debt divided by total assets.
Tobin's Q: sum of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets. Tobin's Q aims to capture the growth opportunities of the firm and tends to be positively associated to CEO compensation.
ROA: earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. This is a measure of accounting performance which is expected to be positively correlated with compensation. We include both contemporaneous and lagged ROA as control variables.
Volatility: annualized standard deviation of monthly stock returns.
Diversification dummy: dummy variable that equals one if a firm operated in more than one business segment. Rose and Shepard (1997) and Anderson et.al (1998) find a positive premium in compensation associated with diversified firms. In some tests we use the number of business segments rather than the dummy.
Stock return: annual stock return. We expect a positive relation between stock market performance and compensation. We include both contemporaneous and lagged stock return as control variables.
Cash: sum of cash and short-term investments divided by total assets.
R&D: research and development expenses divided by total assets.
CAPEX: capital expenditures divided by total assets.
Firm age: number of years since a firm's shares have been publicly listed.
The Appendix table provides definitions and data sources for all variables. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values.
Firm Characteristics and General Managerial Ability Index
We look at the match between firms and general managerial skills using univariate tests. Table 5 presents correlation coefficients between the general ability index and firm characteristics. The table also presents mean firm characteristics for "generalist" and "specialist" CEOs and test for the difference in firm characteristics between the two types of CEOs. A generalist is defined as a CEO with general managerial ability index above the yearly median, while a specialist has an index below the yearly median. As expected, we find that firms with generalist CEOs are bigger, older and more diversified. We also find that firms with generalist CEOs have slightly higher leverage and cash holdings, and lower stock return volatility. We do not find statistically significant differences in terms of accounting and stock market performance (ROA and stock returns) between generalists and specialists. The differences in Tobin's Q, CAPEX and R&D are not economically meaningful, although they are statistically significant.
The results in Table 5 suggest that firm size and diversification are relevant firm characteristics in explaining the relation between the generality of CEO human capital and compensation. With respect to firm size, for instance, at this stage we cannot reject the possibility that the positive correlation between compensation and the generality of human capital is due to the fact that bigger firms may tend to appoint generalist CEOs. A similar reasoning can be applied to diversified firms. We further investigate these issues in multivariate tests in Sections 3 and 4.
With respect to CEO characteristics, we find that generalist CEOs tend to have shorter tenure and to be more frequently hired from outside the firm. We expect this to be the case, since generalist
CEOs are more likely to have worked in different firms.
Do Generalist CEOs Get Paid More?
We investigate the relation between CEO compensation and the generality of managerial skills.
We first use panel regression tests where the dependent variables are CEO total, cash, or equity compensation. We also use a measure of CEO excess compensation based on the CEO's industry experience. We then examine the relation between CEO compensation and the generality of managerial skills in a sample of large versus small firms and diversified versus standalone firms.
We also investigate CEO compensation around CEO turnovers and switches of CEO type.
Finally, we conduct several robustness checks on our primary results. Table 6 presents our main test of whether CEOs with higher general managerial ability receive higher compensation. We run both ordinary least squares (OLS) and firm fixed effects panel regressions, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of CEO total compensation (columns (1)- (4)), the logarithm of CEO cash (salary plus bonus) compensation (columns (5)- (6)) and the logarithm of equity (restricted stock plus option awards) compensation (columns (7)- (8)). Our explanatory variable of interest is the general managerial ability index. The OLS regressions include industry (two-digit SIC) and year dummies. The firm fixed effects specification controls for unobserved sources of firm heterogeneity and also include year dummies. 7 Fixed-effects methods solve "joint determination" problems in which an unobserved time-invariant variable simultaneously determines both total compensation and the general managerial ability index. It is equivalent to looking only at within-firm changes in the general managerial ability index.
CEO Compensation Tests
Because only the effects of within-firm changes in total compensation are taken into account, firm-specific omitted variables cannot explain the observed relationship between CEO compensation and managerial attributes. All reported t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation using firm-level clustered standard errors.
Columns (1)- (2) present the coefficients of a regression of total compensation on firm and CEO attributes but not including the general managerial ability index. This is the base case regression.
We find that firm size is positively and significantly associated with total compensation, which is 7 We obtain consistent findings using CEO fixed effects regressions.
consistent with the findings in Gabaix and Landier (2005) and others. 8 We consider other commonly used firm-level factors affecting executive pay and find that total pay is positively and significantly associated with growth opportunities (Tobin's Q) and firm performance as measured by ROA and stock returns. The only CEO attribute that significantly and consistently impacts total pay is the external hire dummy. We find that external CEO appointments carry a positive and significant wage premium, which is consistent with Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2008) .
Columns (3)- (4) present the coefficients of a regression of total compensation on the general managerial ability index as well as firm and CEO attributes controls. There is strong evidence of a positive and statistically significant relation between total pay and the index. The coefficient on the general managerial ability index variable is positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with CEOs with more general managerial skills carrying a wage premium. It is also economically significant. Using the specification in column (3), a one-standard deviation increase in the index is associated with an increase in total compensation of about 6%. This corresponds to approximately a quarter of a million dollars of extra pay per year.
With respect to the other explanatory variables, the inclusion of the general managerial ability index does not significantly affect the coefficients of the control variables in columns (1)-(2), although the magnitude of the effects is slightly lower in some cases. We still see that firm size and performance are positively associated with total pay and that external CEO appointments carry a significant premium.
Columns (5)-(6) present estimates of similar regressions using cash compensation as the dependent variable, while columns (7)- (8) use equity incentives as the dependent variable. In all specifications we find a positive and significant relation between compensation and the general managerial ability index. The magnitude of the effect, however, is stronger in the case of equity compensation. Using the specifications in columns (5) and (7), a one-standard deviation increase in the index is associated with an increase of 1.8% and 8.6% in cash and equity compensation, respectively. In unreported regression, we find that general managerial ability index is positively associated with equity compensation, if we run a Tobit specification for the ratio of equity compensation to total compensation.
We have documented a positive relation between CEO total pay and an index that captures the degree of generality of managerial skills. The index includes three components related with the external mobility or mobility across industries of executives (past number of industries), past experience as a CEO (past CEO dummy), and educational background (general education dummy). Table 7 presents the estimates of the same regressions as those in Table 6 but now using as main explanatory variables the individual components of the index rather than the aggregate index. We find that the past number of industries and the past CEO dummy are positively and significantly associated with total compensation, while the general education dummy coefficient is insignificant. Thus, the evidence supports the hypothesis that both high external mobility across industries and a past appointment as a CEO carry positive pay premiums.
A CEO that worked in different industries in the past receives an additional pay of 6% in terms of total compensation, while a CEO that has a past CEO appointment receives 5% more. This 
CEO Excess Compensation Tests
We have documented in the previous subsection that CEOs with more general skills earn a significant pay premium. In this section, to examine whether general managerial skills is associated with higher or lower CEO total pay, we measure the percentage difference between a CEO's total pay and the imputed pay given its past industry experience measured by the pay of single-industry CEOs (i.e., the pay of CEOs that worked only in one industry over their career).
We measure excess compensation as the log of the ratio of a CEO's total compensation to its imputed compensation -i.e. the premium or discount in pay resulting from industry mobility.
This measures allows us to do a better match between the compensation of a CEO with more general skills (generalists) and the CEOs with less general skills (specialists) in terms of their industry experience. The measure of CEO compensation is inspired by the measures of excess value used in the corporate diversification literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) ).
In the regressions of Table 8 the dependent variable is the CEO excess compensation. We control for other factors that could affect excess compensation. Firm size, performance, growth opportunities and other firm and CEO characteristics are taken into account using the same set of control variables used in Table 6 . The main explanatory variables of interest are the past multiindustry dummy and the general ability index. We use the past multi-industry dummy as explanatory variable because it matches naturally the definition of the dependent variable in this section. Columns (1)- (2) CEOs with a career path across more than one industry (multi-industry) and single-industry CEOs (single-industry). The pay premium for multi-industry CEOs is more than 10% in the OLS specification in column (1).
Columns (3)-(4) present the coefficients of a regression of CEO excess compensation on the general managerial ability index as well as control variables. There is strong evidence of a positive and statistically significant relation. A one-standard deviation increase in the index is associated with 4.5% more CEO excess compensation using specification (3).
In summary, the findings using the excess compensation measure are consistent with those using total compensation as the dependent variable. The magnitude of the effects is also similar. The results so far support the notion that CEOs with more general managerial skills carry a significant wage premium in the labor market. In particular, CEO compensation is higher for executives that have not made their entire career in a single industry and therefore there is evidence of an industry mobility wage premium.
Effect of Firm Size and Diversification
In the previous subsections, we find evidence of a positive relation between CEO compensation and proxies of CEO general managerial human capital and industry mobility. In this subsection, we investigate whether the relation between general managerial attributes and executive compensation is heterogeneous across different types of firms. We first study firm size because the size of a firm's operations has been shown to be an important determinant of CEO compensation (e.g., Gabaix and Landier (2006)). Second, we study corporate diversification as measured by the diversification dummy (i.e., a firm operates in more than one business segment).
Both firm size and the number of business segments have been used as proxies of the scope and complexity of the firm's operations (e.g., Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) , and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) ). Table 9 presents the estimates of regressions of CEO pay for groups of firms based on their size and whether they are diversified. The specifications and the set of control variables are the same as the ones used in Table 6 . Our explanatory variable of interest is the general managerial ability index.
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 9 present results by splitting the sample into small and large firms based on whether firm size is below the yearly median (small firms in columns (1)-(2)) or above the yearly median (large firms in columns (3)-(4)). We find a positive and statistically significant relation between total compensation and the general managerial ability index in both small and large firms. The magnitude of the effects is also similar in both groups of firms. We conclude that our primary finding is not driven only by large firms. Smaller firms seem also to be willing to pay a similar premium for general managerial skills.
Columns (5)- (8) of Table 9 present results by splitting the sample into with a single business segment (standalone firms in columns (5)- (6)) and diversified firms (multi-business segments firms in columns (7)- (8)). Interestingly, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient only for the diversified firms sample in the firm fixed effects specifications (column (8)). This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that diversified firms are the ones that are in more need and pay a higher premium for executives with general managerial skills. In other words, a generalist manager is more valuable when matched to a generalist firm, such as conglomerates.
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We explore this issue in more detail in Section 4 below.
Evidence from CEO Turnovers
Our evidence so far is based on firm-year panel regression estimates. In this subsection we examine changes in compensation around CEO turnover, in particular when there is a switch of CEO type. We expect to find an increase in CEO compensation when a firm switches from a CEO with less general skills (specialist) to a CEO with more general skills (generalist). We classify CEOs as generalists if their general managerial ability index is above the yearly median, and we classify them as specialists if their index below the median. Furthermore, the effect is likely to be more pronounced when the new CEO is hired from outside the firm as in this case the firm has to pay to access the market (Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2008) ).
We run regression tests where the dependent variable is total, cash, equity or excess compensation. We Use the following explanatory variables to measure the effect on pay from a CEO turnover: (1) no switch of CEO type, which is a dummy that equals one if there is a CEO turnover at time t but there is no switch of CEO type; (2) switch to generalist -external hire, which is a dummy that equals one if there is a CEO turnover at time t and a specialist CEO is replaced by a generalist CEO hired from outside the firm; (3) switch to specialist -external hire, which is a dummy that equals one if there is a CEO turnover at time t and a generalist CEO is replaced by a specialist CEO hired from outside the firm; and (4) switch -internal hire, which is a dummy that equals one if there is a CEO turnover at time t and the new CEO is internally appointed. We include these four variables as regressors and therefore the intercept in the regression captures the benchmark case of no CEO turnover at time t. Table 10 presents the results.
Column (1) presents the coefficients of a regression of total compensation on the four explanatory variables of interest and control variables (same set of variables used in Table 6 ).
The coefficient on switch to generalist -external hire is positive and significant, while the coefficient on switch to specialist -external hire is insignificant at the 5% level. The effect on CEO total compensation of switching from a specialist to a generalist CEO by external appointment is substantial at about 26% extra pay.
Columns (2) and (3) present estimates of similar regressions but using the logarithm of CEO cash and equity compensation as dependent variables. The results show that the increase in compensation associated with a switch from a specialist to a generalist CEO is driven by equity incentives, rather than by increases in salary or bonus. The results are also consistent with a significant impact on CEO excess compensation of a switch from a specialist to a generalist CEO (column (4)).
Overall, there is evidence of an increase in CEO pay when a firm switches from a specialist to a new generalist CEO via an external hire. This is direct evidence that general managerial human capital does command a premium in the CEO labor market.
Robustness
In this subsection we perform several robustness checks of our primary findings. Table 11 presents robustness checks with respect to the general managerial ability index. We alternatively construct the general ability index using the past CEO dummy, the general education dummy, but now using the past number of firms rather than the past number of industries (columns (1)- (2)). The past number of firms measures the number of different firms where an executive worked in the past. The intuition is that a generalist CEO should possess skills that are transferable across firms (and not only industries) rather "firm-specific human capital" that it is valuable only within a particular organization. The second variation of the general managerial ability index is to count the past number of industries based on two-digit SIC codes rather than four-digit SIC codes (columns (3)- (4)). The third variation of the index is to count the past number of CEO positions rather than using the past CEO dummy variable (columns (5)-(6)). We find strong evidence of a positive relation between CEO total pay and the alternative definitions of the general managerial ability index in all specifications. Similar to the results in Table 6 , the effect of the index of general managerial attributes on CEO total pay is always economically and statistically significant.
We also perform robustness checks on the measure of excess compensation. We calculate the measure of excess compensation by performing the match between the multi-industry CEO and the portfolio of single-industry CEOs using two-digit SIC codes instead of the four-digit SIC codes. Using this coarser industry classification has two main implications: first, we ensure that the industries are significantly different from each other, and second, that we have more singleindustry CEOs to use as a benchmark. In untabulated regressions (similar to those in Table 8 ),
we find the results to be robust to this alternative definition of the measure of excess compensation. There is strong evidence of a positive and statistically significant relation between excess compensation and the multi-industry dummy.
Discussion
We go one step further in our analysis and we look at whether there is evidence that higher pay levels by generalist CEOs is consistent with an efficient functioning of the CEO labor market.
An alternative hypothesis is that generalist CEOs accumulate their multi-industry experience because they are just "serial CEOs" that engage in "job hopping" (Giannetti (2010)).
Additionally, generalist CEOs may feature more prominently in databases of executive search firms and have an easier time being recruited. Dasgupta and Ding (2010) emphasize the enhanced role of executive search firms in the last decades. We investigate the relation between generalist CEOs and firm performance to test this alternative explanation of our findings.
Specifically, the alternative hypothesis predicts that firms hiring generalist CEOs would see performance and shareholder returns negatively affected. In untabulated regerssions, we find evidence of a positive relation between shareholder value (Tobin's Q) and the general ability index using an OLS specification, although the relation is not statistically significant when we use a firm fixed effects specification. We also look at whether generalist CEOs exhibit higher turnover or "job hopping". In unreported tests, we do not find evidence consistent with this prediction. The relation between CEO turnover and the general ability index is statistically insignificant and even negative in some specifications. Taken together, the findings do not support the existence of market inefficiencies in the setting of CEO pay. Overall, the results are consistent with an efficient market-based explanation of the significant wage premium awarded to CEOs with general managerial skills.
A Detailed Look at Conglomerate Firms
In sub-section 3.3 we provide evidence that conglomerates pay more, on average, to CEOs with multi-industry career backgrounds. This is not a mechanic effect that large and more diversified firms pay their CEOs more. Interestingly, in our basic tests in Table 6 we do not find evidence that conglomerates per se pay more to their CEOs irrespective of their level of general managerial ability.
In order to perform a more direct test of the relation between firm diversification and CEO compensation we define a new measure of excess compensation: conglomerates excess compensation. While the excess compensation measure helps us to answer the question on whether generalists are paid at a premium or a discount when compared to specialists, the conglomerates excess compensation measure answers a different question: whether diversified firms pay an additional premium to their CEOs. We use Compustat segment-level data to construct the conglomerates excess compensation. We compare the actual CEO compensation of a diversified firm to their imputed standalone compensation for individual business segments.
The imputed compensation is the average compensation of the portfolio of industries that matches the business segments of the diversified firm where the industry-level compensation is the median of across standalone firms in a industry. The industry match is done at the four-digit SIC code level where there are five or more stand-alone firms or at the highest SIC level when there are at least five stand-alone firms. In the case of standalone firms, the excess compensation measure is simply the difference between the CEO total compensation and the median compensation of standalone firms in its industry. The conglomerates excess compensation is the log of the ratio of a CEO's total compensation to its imputed compensation. This measure is similar in spirit to the excess value measure used to estimate the value effect of diversification (e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) ). The main difference is that we compare the compensation of a conglomerate with the compensation of an equivalent portfolio of standalone firms in the same industries instead of comparing firm valuation.
Rose and Shepard (1997) and Anderson et al. (1998) find a significant compensation premium in diversified firms. However, while controlling for industry effects they take only into account the core business of the conglomerate, ignoring the industries of the secondary business segments.
By using our measure of conglomerate excess compensation we make sure to match the conglomerate's compensation to a benchmark that includes all the industries where the conglomerate operates in. The positive and significant coefficient of the diversification dummy in columns (1)- (2) is consistent with CEOs of diversified firms earning higher wages relative to standalone firms. The conglomerates CEO pay premium is substantial at 26% using the specification in column (1).
Columns (3)- (4) present the estimates using the number of segments as main explanatory variable. We find a positive and significant relation between the number of business segments and CEO total compensation.
Overall, using our measure of conglomerates excess compensation, we find evidence consistent with Rose and Shepard (1997) who argue that diversified firms are more complex organizations, and more difficult to manage, and therefore CEOs in diversified firms should be paid at a premium relative to stand-alone firms. Anderson et al. (1998) argue that the compensation premium in conglomerates is not necessarily associated with poorer corporate governance in these firms. Our findings also suggest that conglomerates are only willing to pay a premium to CEOs to compensate them for their general skills. In fact, Laux (2001) suggests that it is cheaper to provide incentives in conglomerates that standalones.
An alternative view is that diversifications destroy value due to greater agency costs, which would be associated with higher rent extraction by managers (Jensen (1986) ). There is a wide literature on the existence of a diversification discount (Berger and Ofek (1995) , Lang and Stulz (1994) , Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) among others) which could be consistent with higher agency costs, however, there is also contradictory evidence that diversification de per se causes a loss of firm value (Villalonga (2004)).
Finally, we find a positive and significant relation between the conglomerates excess compensation and the index of general managerial ability in columns (5)- (6). This suggests that not only conglomerates pay a premium to CEOs relative to standalone firms but that the premium for general managerial skills is greater in conglomerates. In untabulated results, we also find that that the coefficient of the interaction variable between the diversification dummy and the general ability index is positive and significant.
We check for the robustness of the results using a finer measure of conglomerate excess compensation, where the imputed compensation is now calculated imposing the requirement that standalone firms should have single-industry CEOs (i.e., executives that have always worked in the same industry). In untabulated results, we still find a compensation premium in diversified firms when we use this finer measure of conglomerate excess compensation.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the hypothesis that general managerial skills are paid at premium relative to firm-specific skills. We construct a new measure of the generality of human capital based on a CEO's external mobility across industries, experience as top executive, and education. We find a positive and significant relation between the index of general managerial ability and CEO compensation using the sample of S&P 1500 firms in the 1993-2007 period. The results are robust to the inclusion of many firm and CEO characteristics as control variables, including firm and CEO fixed effects.
We measure the compensation premium to generalist CEOs using a new measure of excess compensation that compares the total compensation of a CEO that has worked in many industries with the average compensation of a matched portfolio of single-industry CEOs. We find the excess annual compensation premium is as high as 10%.
Our paper provides direct evidence of the growing importance of general managerial skills versus firm-specific skills. This trend is likely to increase the outside opportunities of CEOs with general skills and therefore lead to higher levels of CEO pay. Our findings highlight the importance of the inner workings of the CEO labor market to understand the evolution of CEO pay in recent decades.
Table 1 CEO Compensation and General Managerial Ability Index by Year
This table presents average score of the general managerial ability index and average CEO total compensation per year from 1993 to 2007. The index of general managerial ability is the first factor of applying the principal components method to three proxies of general managerial ability (past number of industries, past CEO dummy, and general education dummy). The sample consists of Execucomp firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx. Average CEO excess compensation for the sample of CEOs that worked in more than one four-digit SIC industry (multi-industry CEOs) are also shown. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. Table 3 
Year

CEO Compensation and General Managerial Ability Index by Industry
This table presents average score for the CEO general ability index and average CEO total compensation for each of the Fama-French 12 industries. Average CEO total compensation for the sub-samples of CEOs above (high index) and below (low index) the median yearly general ability index and the t-statistic of the difference, and average CEO excess compensation for the sample of CEOs that worked in more than one four-digit SIC industry (multi-industry CEOs) and its tstatistic are also shown. The sample consists of Execucomp firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx in the 1993-2007 period. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. 
Table 6 CEO Compensation and General Managerial Ability Index
This table presents estimates of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of CEO total, cash and equity compensation on the general managerial ability index and other CEO-and firm-level control variables. The sample consists of Execucomp firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx in the 1993-2007 period. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) This table presents estimates of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions of the CEO excess compensation on a dummy that takes the value of one if a CEO worked in more than one industry (past multi-industry dummy) and the general ability index and other CEO-and firm-level control variables. The excess compensation is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the CEO total compensation to its imputed compensation from single-industry CEOs that match the CEO's past industry (four-digit SIC) experience. The sample consists of Execucomp firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx in the 1993-2007 period. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (1) if there is a CEO turnover but no switch of CEO type (no switch of CEO type); (2) if a specialist CEO is replaced by a generalist CEO hired from outside the firm (switch to generalist -external hire); (3) if a generalist CEO is replaced by a specialist CEO hired from outside the firm (switch to specialist -external hire); and (4) if the new CEO is internally appointed (switch -internal hire). The sample consists of Execucomp firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx in the 1993-2007 period. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) This table presents estimates of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions of the logarithm of CEO total compensation on the general managerial ability index and other CEO-and firm-level control variables. Alternative definitions of the general managerial ability index are used: index 1 uses past number of firms, past CEO dummy, and general education dummy; index 2 uses past number of industries (two-digit SIC), past CEO dummy, and general education dummy; and index 3 uses past number of industries (four-digit SIC), past number of CEO positions, and general education dummy. The sample consists of Execucomp firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx in the 1993-2007 period. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) This table presents estimates of OLS and firm fixed effects panel regressions of the conglomerates excess compensation on the firm's diversification dummy and number of business segments and other CEO-and firm-level control variables. The excess compensation is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of the CEO total compensation to its imputed compensation from standalone firms that match the firm's current business segments. The sample consists of Execucomp firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx in the 1993-2007 period. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Figure 1 CEO Compensation and General Managerial Ability Index
This table presents average score of the general managerial ability index and average CEO total compensation per year from 1993 to 2007.The sample consists of Execucomp firms for which CEO profile data are available from BoardEx. Average CEO excess compensation for the sample of CEOs that worked in more than one four-digit SIC industry (multi-industry CEOs) are also shown. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile values. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the Appendix. 
